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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE P. CAMPBELL, ) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, 
) 
vs. Case No. 15912 ) 
PEARL STAGG, 
Defendant and 
) 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brings this action against defendant to 
recover for personal injury. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff entered into a con-
tract with defendant's insurance company to settle plaintiff's 
claim and the contract is a bar to plaintiff's action. 
Plaintiff claims that the contract was void or voidable 
because of a mutual mistake of fact between plaintiff and Lavell 
Brown, agent for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. 
Defendant claims that her insurance company was State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and that her insurance 
company is an indispensable party to this action. 
Defendant claims the facts surrounding the execution 
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of the instrument do not amount to a mutual mistake of fact 
Defendant claims that plaintiff, after signing the 
contract, by his conduct, further ratified the contract and 
should be estopped to deny its validity. 
Defendant claims that the court erred in its appli-
cation of Section 78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, allowing 
interest on special damages retroactively. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a money judgment against 
defendant although it failed to cancel the contract between 
plaintiff and defendant's insurance company. 
The lower court in its findings determined that 
interest was due on special damages from the date of the injury, 
September 9, 1973, until March 10, 1978, in accordance with 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-27-44. 
The court, in its conclusions, :=;tated that State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was not a necessary party 
to the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
T 
I 
1. 
I 
I 
I 
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AS TO PLEADINGS : 
Plaintiff's complaint was for damages for personal . 
I 
injury. R 3-4. The summons was dated the 20th of February, 1974• 
and served the 23rd of February, 1974. 
- 2 -
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On March 15, 1974, defendant answered and as an 
affirmative defense plead that the contract entered into 
between plaintiff and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company was a bar to plaintiff's action. R-6 
On the 29th of March, 1976, the court ordered, 
"that the plaintiff file an amendment to his complaint to 
plead the fact of the 'Agreement and Release' signed by the 
plaintiff and LaVell Brown on September 21, 1973--------said 
amendment is to reflect plaintiff's position as to said ~greement 
and Release'--------". R-54 In compliance with the court order, 
plaintiff amended his complaint by adding paragraph 7 and 8 that 
read: R-52 
7. That an "Agreement and Release" was signed by 
the plaintiff on September 21, 1973, a copy of which 
is attached hereto and made a part of this Complaint 
as if fully set forth. Said Agreement was VOID or 
VOIDABLE by reason that there was a mutual mistake of 
fact between the plaintiff and LaVell Brown, agent for 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, as to the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff on the 9th day of September, 
1973. That the plaintiff in fact suffered certain 
injuries to his neck and spine and other areas of his 
body which were unknown to him or Lavell Brown at the 
time said "Agreement and Release" was signed. 
8. That the plaintiff has properly and effectively 
voided said "Agreement and Release", and that said 
"Agreement and Release" is not a bar to his recovery 
in this action. 
By leave of court, defendant amended her answer to 
plead; (1) release, (2) that the contract between plaintiff and 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company amounted to a bar 
to the action; (3) that plaintiff had ratified the contract of 
September 21, 1973; and (4) further that he was estopped to deny 
- 3 -
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the contract. R- 92 and 93 
AS TO OBJECTION TO TRIAL UNTIL THE INDISPENSABLE PARTY WAS 
JOINED. 
-.., 
I 
i 
I 
Before the conunencement of the trial, on October 3, 
1977, defendant's counsel informed the court that, in his opinion· 
the court could not proceed with the trial until the proper par-'/ 
ties were named in the pleadings. Minute Entry dated October 3
1 
1977, found seven pages after R-536. 
I 
Written objection to the trial for the reason that t~~j 
was an indispensable party was filed January 18, 1978. R-220 
AS TO EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT. 
On September 21, 1973, Lavell Brown, agent for State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Eugene P. Campbell 
met in Helper, Utah for the purpose of settling Mr. Campbell's 
claim against Pearl Stagg. 
LaVell Brown proposed a settlement of the entire 
matter for a sum of either $1600 or $1800 on a release basis. 
Tr-155, lines 12-25. 
Mr. Campbell refused to settle on a complete release 
because as Mr. Campbell said, ''When he gave me the document to 
sign the first one, it completely released them of any liabilitY I 
of any type to me. And I refused that. When he gave me the 
next one, Exhibit 28, I read it over. He helped me read it 
over. And I decided that because I had already been to Dr. 
Gorishek, they still hadn't determined what was wrong with~' 
- 4 -
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whether it was going to be for a short period or a long period--
then I decided I would go ahead and sign that one covering any 
expenses for the next couple of months". Tr 127-128 
At the time the Agreement and Release was signed, Mr. 
Campbell understood State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany had agreed to pay medical expenses as set forth in the doc-
ument and to pay $72 per day as more fully set forth in the doc-
ument. Tr-158 This was important to Mr. Campbell when he signed 
the document because of the payment of future medical bills and 
wages. Tr-159 
Mr. Campbell did not attempt to contact Mrs. Stagg at 
any time. Tr-153. Mr. Campbell was of the opinion that his busi-
ness was with the insurance company, not Mrs. Stagg. Tr-153. 
At the time of the signing of the Agreement and Release, 
on September 21, 1973, Mr. Brown's impression, as shown by his 
report of September 21, 1973, as to Mr. Campbell's condition was, 
"bruises and cervical sprain". Tr-84 Mr. Brown's definition of 
a cervical sprain is, "I believe a cervical sprain to be a stretch-
ing of the neck muscles causing a pain--trauma to the neck". Tr-85. 
Mr. Brown recorded in his Filing Sheet, Bodily Injury Claims, 
"Coverage A & B closed, payment on open release. I did not have 
medical bills. To be paid when received. Low estimate $771.39 
plus steering column and tire. I allowed $850.00. When I left 
for Price last night I thought I would be able to settle on Blue 
Release. Claimant is still under Doctor's care with neck and back 
so I negotiated an open release". Exhibit 29 
- 5 -
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Mr. Brown said at trial, "Because he (Mr. Campbell) 
wasn't sure about his neck or injuries or what he might have. 
So we then discussed and worked out the settlement that we d~ 
on the other release, which we referred to it as an open relea1l 
because it leaves the medical coverage open and the loss of wagi: 
open within a specified limit". Tr-87 
MR. CAMPBELL KEPT A COPY OF THE CONTRACT UNTIL HE TOOK IT TO RH 
ATTORNEY IN DECEMBER, 1973. 
Eugene P. Campbell was given a copy of the Agreement a: 
Release after it was signed on September 21, 1973. Mr. Campbell 
kept the Agreement and Release in his possession until December 
of 1973, when he took it to his Attorney, Jackson Howard. Tr·l): 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 21, 19 7 3 , MR. CAMPBELL CONTINUED TO ASK FOR THE 
BENEFITS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONfRACT AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
KEPT PAYING. 
Mr. Campbell had not cashed the Draft given to him on 
September 21, 1973, by Mr. Brown, at the time he went to Dr. Gor·1 
ishek on September 26, 1973. 
On September 30, 1973, Mr. Campbell wrote to Mr. Brown 
as follows: 
I would like to let you know what has transpired 
this past week. 
The check you gave me on 9-21-73 as you know, 
had to be cleared thru another bank, causing me lost 
time and great embarrassment. 
I was to buy a car from a fellow worker on Wed. 
9-26-73. We both left work at 1:00 p.m. on 9-26-73, 
- 6 -
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and met at the Walker Bank in Price. As you know 
what would happen, they could not cash the check 
and I could not buy the car. 
Now this has left me afoot for an additional 
seven to ten days while the check clears, plus the 
work hours lost on the job . 
. I don't want to thank you for all this incon-
venience but I do expect prompt compensation for my 
loss two hours @ $9.00 per hour. 
. On the ~ame day 9-26-73, I had an appointment 
with Dr. Gorishek. Lost hours for this appointment 
amounted to one (1) hour of straight time pay @ $9.00 
per hour plus two (2) hours of double time pay@ $16.50 
per hour. 
I also had to buy another prescription@ $4.55 
from Kelley's Drug Store. 
I feel I should also be compensated for an add-
itional six days without a car at $8.00 a day = $48.00. 
This grand total comes to $112.55 that I feel 
State Farm Ins. Co. can pay. 
You can send me a check, one I can cash, or stop 
by my apartment. 
Signed, Eugene P. Campbell Ex. 57 
The draft given to Mr. Campbell by Mr. Brown on Sept-
ember 21, 1973, was sent for collection by Walker Bank and Trust 
Company, Price, Utah, and not paid by The Greeley National Bank, 
Greeley, Colorado, until October 1, 1973. Exhibit 56. 
Mr. Campbell continued to go to doctors in connection 
with his neck injury and ran up medical bills which he would sub-
mit to the insurance company. Exhibits 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 
64, 65, 66, 67, and 68. As late as December 3, 1973, Mr. Campbell 
verified his wage loss and wrote Mr. Brown. Exhibit 60 
After the original draft was negotiated, Eugene P. Camp-
- 7 -
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bell received, endorsed and negotiated drafts as follows: 
Draft #449 101 Q, dated 10/15/73 in the amount of $20.0Q 
Draft #449 102 Q, dated 10/15/73 in the amount of $13.SO 
Draft #449 112 Q, dated 10/29/73 in the amount of $4.35 
Draft #435 367 Q, dated 12/13/73 in the amount of $19.00 
Draft #449 178 Q, dated 12/31/73 in the amount of $20.00 
Draft #449 188 Q, dated 1/12/74 in the amount of $74.SO 
Draft #449 244 Q, dated 2/5/74 in the amount of $33.50 
Draft #449 245 Q, dated 2/5/74 in the amount of $25.00 
Draft #457 960 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $147.00 
Draft #457 961 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $78.00 
Draft #457 962 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $49.00 
Draft :/t457 963 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $1349.70 
Draft #457 964 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $13.53 
Draft #457 965 Q, dated 2/21/74 in the amount of $1027.~ 
AS TO MR. CAMPBELL'S MEDICAL CONDITION. 
September 9, 1973 
At 2:45 p.m. on September 9, 1973, plaintiff, Eugene 
P. Campbell, presented himself to the Outpatient and Emergency 
Service of the Carbon Hospital for medical attention. 
Dr. William Gorishek was called to give medical atten· 
tion to plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell. Plaintiff, Eugene P. 
Campbell, gave Dr. Gorishek a medical history on September 9, 
1973, of having been involved in an automobile accident and as 
a result suffered pain in his neck, headache, swelling of the 
right elbow and left knee. Exhibit 39. Tr-16. 
- 8 -
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Dr. Gorishek, on September 9, 1973, examined the 
person of Eugene P. Campbell and ordered x-rays of parts of 
Mr. Campbell's body. Tr-23 The clinical examination showed 
spasm in the tissues of the neck, Tr-33, and limitation of 
motion in all directions, to-wit: lateral, rotation, flexion, 
extension, Tr-34, and soreness and stiffness in his neck. Tr-41 
The x-ray of the neck and thoracic spine showed: 
"The patient shows straightening in the neck region. 
Arthritic changes are apparent, with both anterior 
and some posterior spurring. T-7 is wedged, though 
the characteristics of this is a remote change. No 
other possible acute wedge fractures are identified. 
There is somewhat more arthritic change in the thoracic 
spine than expected in a 42 year old man. 
Both thoracic and cervical spines show more arthritic 
changes than expected. There is posterior spurring 
of significant degree in the cervical region with mod-
erately advanced arthritic changes at several levels. 
T-7 is wedged, but this appears to be old most likely." 
Exhibit 39 
After examining Mr. Campbell, Dr. Gorishek, on September 
9, 1973, reached a diagnosis of Mr. Campbell's condition of a 
cervical strain. Exhibit 39 Or. Gorishek's definition of a 
cervical strain is ''excessive stretching or over exertion of the 
muscles and other soft tissue in the cervical area". Tr-39, lines 
14-17. Soft tissues in the cervical area consist of muscles, Tr-24; 
! 
t ligaments, Tr-25; veins, Tr-26; arteries, Tr-27; nerves, Tr-28; 
nerve root, Tr-30; and cervical discs, Tr-32. 
On September 9, 1973, Or. Gorishek told Mr. Campbell, 
"He had a soft tissue injury and probably a strain that would 
eventually clear up by itself, at least with treatment. If 
-9-
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symptoms persisted and became worse, then further studies were 
indicated." Tr-19, lines 7-10. 
Dr. Gorishek on September 9, 1973, prescribed a 
muscle relaxant and pain medication for Mr. Campbell and 
advised him in addition to taking the prescription drugs, to 
apply heat to his neck as well as massaging the muscle. Tr-17, 
lines 6-8. 
On September 9, 1973, Dr. Gorishek believed Mr. Camp·, 
bell's condition to more or less of a minor nature. Tr-17, 
lines 17-19. 
On September 9, 1973, Mr. Campbell's neck was mostly 
sore on the left side. 
On September 9, 1973, Dr. Gorishek believed that the 
muscles and ligaments of Mr. Campbell's neck were injured. Tr·11 
On September 9, 1973, there was no way at that point 
to determine the extent of the damage to his nerves. Tr-28 
Compression of a nerve root may cause pain. Pressure on a nerve 
regardless of the location, may cause pain through the various 
fiber tracts within the nerve itself. Tr-29 Pain which is 
caused by irritation of the nerve roots is always accompanied hi 
muscle spasm. Tr-34 
The x-rays that were taken at the hospital on Septembe 
9, 1973, showed a straightening of the curve in the neck. Tr·ll 
! 
Dr. Gorishek stated in regard to this condition, ''With the stra·! 
ightening of the cervical neck, a portion of the neck, it means' 
that the muscles are guarding and tending to straighten out the 
- 10 -
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cervical spine from its usual normal curvature." Tr-35 
The x-rays of September 9, 1973, showed the anterior 
spurring in the cervical area. Tr-35. This was significant to 
or. Gorishek because the spurring--even in a slight trauma, 
could force back against the nerve roots and cause pain and 
discomfort. Tr-36. 
As of September 9, 1973, the pain in Mr. Campbell's 
neck could have been caused by a cervical disc being pooched 
out a little. Tr-42. 
September 19, 1973 
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on September 19, 
1973. The symptoms and signs were the same including the sore-
ness on the left side. Tr-44. 
On September 19, 1973, Dr. Gorishek prescribed a 
cervical collar. The purpose of the cervical collar was to 
support the structure of the neck, to splint the neck, to splint 
and immobilize the neck. Tr-45. 
Dr. Gorishek stated upon questioning that he, Dr. 
Gorishek, knew that Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck but 
the consequences of the injury turned out worse than he origin-
ally thought. To put it another way, Dr. Gorishek said he knew 
that Mr. Campbell had an injury to his neck but the exact nature 
of the injury was unknown. Tr-59-60. 
Eugene P. Campbell admits at the time that Dr. Gorishek 
prescribed the neck collar, September 19, 1973, he was having 
considerable pain and discomfort with his neck. Tr-143. Mr. 
- 11 -
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Campbell took off a half a day's work on the 19th of September, 
1973, to go see Dr. Gorishek because he was having difficult y, 
Tr-144. 
September 26, 1973 
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on September 26 
' 
1973. The symptoms and signs were the same. Tr-46. 
On September 26, 1973, Dr. Gorishek further treated 
Mr. Campbell by the injection of Xylocaine, a local anesthetic 
to relieve pain, and Indicin, a medication used to relieve pab 
produced by arthritis. Tr-46-47. 
By September 26, 1973, Dr. Gorishek suspected that Mr. 
I 
Campbell's pain and discomfort was arthritis aggravated by traui; 
Tr-47-48. 
October 30, 1973 
Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on October 30, 191J. 
Mr. Campbell still had the same symptoms of pain, discomfort and 
soreness in his neck. Tr-49. 
November 13, 1973 
On November 13, 1973, Mr. Campbell's symptoms and sig~' 
were exactly the same except Mr. Campbell was having some left 
arm soreness. Tr-49. 
December 7, 1973 
On December 7, 1973, Dr. Gorishek made a diagnosis of 
possible advanced arthritis with nerve root irritation. Tr-SO.! 
It was Dr. Gorishek's opinion that the pathogenic condition of 
Mr. Campbell's neck was undoubtedly the same September 9, 1973, 
- 12 -
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as it was December 7, 1973. Tr-50. Pathogenic being defined by 
Dr. Gorishek as "the cause of the illness or symptom". Tr-51. 
December 19, 1973 
After Dr. William Gorishek treated Mr. Campbell, he 
was treated by Dr. Robert H. Lamb. Dr. Lamb had Mr. Campbell 
admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on December 19, 1973. On 
December 19, 1973, Mr. Campbell gave a medical history to Dr. 
Lamb as follows: 
"The patient was involved in an accident 3i 
years ago when he fell two stories injuring his 
back and neck. The patient has had the onset of 
sensation in the left hand in the ulnar nerve dis-
tribution and more recently in the median nerve 
distribution. The patient also describes a sensa-
tion of a vague pain under the left shoulder on 
the left which radiates down the lateral aspect of 
the arm. The patient denies any weakness.: Exh. 40 
Mr. Campbell was seen in consultation by Dr. Thoen, 
who felt he had a herniated cervical disc and suggested initial 
conservative therapy. 
On the hospitalization commencing December 19, 1973, 
Mr. Campbell gave Dr. Thoen the following history: 
"This 42 year old man was admitted because of 
pain in the neck and the left arm since several months 
ago when he was involved in an automobile accident. 
He was severely shaken up by the injury. His neck has 
been stiff and aching ever since. He has had pain run-
ning into the left shoulder and down the left arm into 
the 3rd 4th and 5th digits of the left hand but more 
common in the 3rd and 4th. It is accentuated by certain 
movements of the head and neck but not by coughing or 
sneezing." 
A cervical myelogram was performed and revealed some 
lack of filling of the left nerve root pouch of CS-6 with a trans-
verse ridge like filling defect across the CS-6 interspace. The 
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patient was treated conservatively and gradually responded. 
Mr. Campbell was discharged January 4, 1974, with a 
final diagnosis of cervical disc syndrome. 
September 2-11, 1974 
Ex .. 
Mr. Campbell continued to have problems involving his 
neck and was therefore admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital on 
September 2, 1974 and discharged September 11, 1974, Exhibit 41, 
for the purpose of an operation known as an anterior C5-6 disc 
and fusion. Prior to the operation the diagnostic aid of a cer· 
vical myelogram was used which showed: 
"The C-5/6 ventral and central defect is associati 
with osteophyte indentation at the C-5/6 level. The c.i 
5/6 joint space is narrowed. The root sleeves are pre· 
served in all cervical levels." 
The radiologist, Richard R. Flynn, M.D. had the follow· 
ing impression: 
"Cervical ventral column defect is located at the I 
C-5/6 level following the contour of posterior spurs. 
In retrospect, the myelogram study of 12-22-73 wasp~ 
dominantly subdural accounting for the peculiar cervic1: 
appearance, observed at this study." 
Report of myelogram, Exhibit 41. 
It is the opinion of Dr. Thoen that "any herniated dist 
I 
thoracic outlet syndrome that may result from a hyper extension I 
I 
injury would initially present itself as a cervical strain and I 
would be almost impossible to distinguish one from the other un· • 
less one were a neurologist and examined the patient." Tr-189. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY IS A 
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION, 
Eugene P. Campbell, plaintiff, admits that he settled 
his claim for personal injury and property damage against the 
defendant, Pearl Stagg, by entering into a contract with defendant's 
insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
Plaintiff claims there was a mutual mistake of fact between the 
insurance company's agent and plaintiff, as to the nature and 
extent of his injuries. Plaintiff, in his complaint, states plain-
tiff has properly and effectively voided said "Agreement and Release." 
R-52. Plaintiff's final Amended Complaint has no reference whatso-
ever to the contract between plaintiff and defendant's insurance 
company. R-109. 
To rescind a contract the trial court, of necessity, would 
apply equitable principles. To rescind a contract all parties inter-
ested in the contract must be joined. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, as the insurer of defendant, has an interest 
and is one contracting party of the contract that would have to 
be set aside. 
"A court cannot adjudicate directly upon the rights 
of a person without having him either actually or 
constructively before it. As a general rule, ~here 
can be no binding adjudication of a per~on's r7gh~s 
in the absence of that person, ... Accordingly, ~t 7s 
a general rule that e~ery pers~n whose rig~t~ it is 
sought to adjudicate in an action must be Joined 
therein... . · t Although one party has brought an action aga7ns . 
another if there is a failure to join therein certain 
other p~rties, the court will not, or, ~s.som~ courts 
have stated, cannot, proceed with the litigation or 
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proceed to a final decision, and hence such erso 
are designated "indispensable" or "necessaryf. par~~e• 
although some courts use the term "necessary" in a '• 
sense less absolute than that in which they use th 
term, "indispensable". e 
The burden of procuring the presence of all such 
indispensable parties is on the plaintiff." Parties 
59 Am Jur 2d 483-484, Sec. 96. 
"It frequently is said that persons who are indispens· 
parties and must be joined as parties of record are r'.1 whos~ interests are such that no final decree be~e~! 
parties before the court which would do justice betwel 
them can be made without leaving the controversy in sr 
a situation that its final determination may be whon, 
inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Partii 
59 Am Jur 2d 487, Sec. 96. 
"The rules of equity with reference to parties controli 
in a suit wherein plaintiff seeks to enforce equit~h 
rights through the equitable remedy of cancellatioom 
rescission. All persons whose rights, interests, or 
relations with or through the subject matter of the 
suit would be affected by the cancellation or rescissi:i, 
are proper and necessary parties in order that they• 
have an opportunity to be heard; and unless they are 
made parties the court is precluded from rendering a I 
judgment or decree of cancellation. Where such persor,; 
are not made parties originally, they may be brought 
in by amendment; but until the omission is corrected 
the court should not proceed further, even though no 
objection is made by any party litigant." Cancellatio:i 
of Instruments, 12 C.J.S. Sec. 52, 1027-1028. 
A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
for the December Term 1854, Shields vs. Barrow, 17 H, 411, annour~ 
the general rule. There are 
"three classes of parties to a bill in equity. They ·I 
are: 1. Formal parties. 2. Persons having an in~e:es' 
1.• n the controversy and who ought to be made partte ' \ 
' h · h re· in order that the court may act on that rule w ic e~W 
quires it to decide on, and finally determine t~e ll 
controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting 8lv 
the rights involved in it. These persons are coffi!IlOO' 
- 16 -
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
termed necessary parties; but if their interests are 
separable from those of the parties before the court 
so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do ' 
complete and final justice, without affecting other 
persons not before the court, the latter are not in-
dispensable parties. 3. Persons who not only have 
an interest in the controversy, but an interest of 
such a nature that a final decree cannot be made with-
out either affecting that int~rest, or leaving the con-
troversy in such a condition that its final termination 
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science. 
A bill to rescind a contract affords an example of 
this kind. For, if only a part of those interested 
in the contract are before the court, a decree of 
rescission must either destroy the rights of those 
who are absent, or leave the contract in full force 
as respects them; while it is set aside, and the 
contracting parties restored to their former condi-
tion, as to the others. We do not say that no case 
can arise in which this may be done; but it must be 
a case in which the rights of those before the court 
are completely separable from the rights of those 
absent, otherwise the latter are indispensable parties." 
Utah follows the general rule announced in the Shields 
vs. Barrow case, supra. 
Our Utah Court in the case of Houser vs. Smith et al. 
19 Utah 150; 56 P. 683 ( 1899) stat es: 
"Courts have no right to dispose of and adjudicate 
upon property rights of persons not parties to the 
case and strangers to the record, and a judgment 
rendered against persons not parties to the action, 
and over whom the court acquired no jurisdiction, 
is absolutely void as to them." 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had a 
contract right in its settlement agreement with plaintiff and the 
court should not adjudicate upon this property right without having 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company before it. 
In the Utah case of South Kamas Irrigation Company vs. 
- 17 -
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Provo River Water Users' Association, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d 
851 (1960) the plaintiff attempted to have an adjudication of 
its right to use a tunnel. The plaintiff recognized that such 
a judgment in and of itself would not be sufficient to require 
the defendant to allow the use of its tunnel in the absence of 
consent of the United States. The United States would not consc: 
to be named as a party in the action. The court said in view 0; 
the fact that the judgment which the plaintiff seeks against~ 
defendant cannot be enforced against it without enforcing it 
against the United States, the United States is an indispensablE 
party to this action and its sovereign immunity should be upheli 
Plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, could not enforce a~ 
rights that he obtained against Pearl Stagg without effecting 
the rights of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
Certainly State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is an 
indispensable party to this action. 
Our Utah Court speaking on necessary parties in the 
case of Stone vs. Salt Lake City, et al. 11 Utah 2d 196; 356 p,1c( 
631 (1960) states: 
"One should be regarded as a necessary party to a 
lawsuit if he has rights or interests involved in 
the subject matter in such a way tha~ his presence 
is essential to a full, fair and equitable det:r-
rnination of his rights and those of other parties 
to the suit, and necessary pa:tie~ inc~ude the . 'ti· 
g rantees of a deed in an action in which the val~l. > II 
of such deed is under attack. 
\ 
Another Utah Case handling the matter of an indispensa, 
· t h t d" fferently In the case of State ~ party puts i sornew a i · 
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i 
Mutual Insurance Company vs. Jack B. Holt, 531 P.2d 495 (1975) 
state Farm Mutual Insurance Company brought an action for a 
declaratory judgment against the person it contracted the insur-
ance with, a person to whom the insured vehicle had been sold 
and persons who had been injured by the insured vehicle. The 
supreme Court held that there was coverage on the automobile in 
question. The injured persons showing to the trial court that 
their injury was much greater than the coverage, made a motion 
to split up the twenty thousand dollar coverage. The tort feasor, 
or the person driving the insured vehicle, although named in the 
lawsuit, was never served. The court answered the claims of the 
injured persons by stating that the tort feasor had a right to be 
heard before the judgment could be found against him. The court 
pointed out that if the injured persons wanted money from the 
insurance company they must either accept settlement with the 
insurance company or sue the tort feasor. 
In this case, Eugene P. Campbell, plaintiff has accepted 
1cl an offer from the insurance company and entered into a written 
I 
v. 
, I 
I 
ao.j 
contract, but in plaintiff's action to set aside the contract 
fails to join the insurance company. 
California, in Bank of California Nat. Ass'n. et al v. 
~perior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco et al., 
106 P.2d 879 (1940) addressing itself to indispensable parties who 
want affirmative relief, such as the cancellation of an instrument, 
states: 
"Where plaintiff seeks some type of affirmative relief 
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which, ~f granted, would injure or affect the int 
of a third person not joined the third person . eresti 
"indispensable party". ' is an 
A court which attempts to proceed in an action whe 
indispensable parties are not before the court actn 
beyond its jurisdiction and may be res trained by s 
prohibition." 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE 
RELEASE AS TO STATE FARM MUTIJAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OPERATES TO DISCHARGE AND RELEASE THE DEFENDANT FROM ANY LIA-
BILITY IN THE PRESENT ACTION. 
Recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court have held 
that a release is broad enough to bar recovery not only by the 
parties to the contractural release, but also by parties excludeo 
from the express language of the release contract. 
In Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 
109; 493 P.2d 625 (1972) it states: 
"Action against corporation alleging that its employee, 
while operating motor vehicle within scope of his emplo! 
ment, negligently collided with plaintiff's vehicle, 
causing plaintiff injuries and property loss, where~ 
defendant moved for summary judgment on ground that 
plaintiff's covenant not to sue employee operated as 
matter of law to release defendant from liability and, 
prior to hearing on motion, plaintiff filed action 
against employee and his carrier for reformation of 
covenant not to sue. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Joseph E. Nelson J., granted decree o~ refor· 
mat ion, denied defendant 1 s motion for summary Judgment 
and granted defendant's petition for intermediate appea 
The Supreme Court held that where covenant not to s~ 
specified that inJured plaintiff understood that ~gre:i 
ment was to terminate further controversy respect1ngh t 
claims for damages which plaintiff had asserted or t 8 
he or his personal representatives might thereafter 
- 20 -
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as~ert against negligent employee, the covenant con-
stituted a complete exoneration of employee and re-
moved any foundation upon which to impute negligence 
to employer, whose liability was derivative and sec-
ondary, and plaintiff was not entitled to maintain 
action against employer." 
A year later in Williams v. Green 29 Utah 2d 141; 506 
P.2d 64 (1973) the court extended the protection of a release 
to a doctor who was not a party to the release contract. The 
plaintiff suffered an injury while at work for an oil company and 
the defendant doctor treated his injuries. Subsequently the 
plaintiff negotiated and settled his claim against his employer 
by executing a release with the employer for all damages which 
may develop in the future as a result of the injury. Two years 
after the injury the plaintiff attempted to bring this action 
against the doctor claiming damages for the same injuries he had 
previously settled with the employer. The court held as a matter 
of law (by sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment) 
that the plaintiff could not maintain his cause of action against 
the defendant doctor on the bare assertion that the release was 
not intended to include the claim against the doctor. 
Finally, in 1974, the Utah Supreme Court announced 
their decision in Catmull v. Medical Integrated Systems, Inc. 
30 Utah 2d 334; 517 P.2d 1023. This case came to the Supreme 
Court on appeal from the trial court's granting of sunnnary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff's child had been swim-
ming at the Hygeia Ice company pool in Sugarhouse and was found 
lying at the bottom of the pool. The lifeguards gave the child 
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mouth-to-mouth resuscitation until the defendant's ambulance 
arrived. The controverted fact was whether or not the child 
was revived or dead at the time the ambulance arrived. The 
evidence is uncontroverted however, that the child was dead on 
arrival at the hospital. Plaintiffs, through negotiations by 
their attorney, entered into a release contract with the Hygeia 
Ice Company releasing and forever discharging the said Hygeia 
Ice Company of and from any and all claims, foreseen and unfore,, 
and the consequences thereof. 
In this action against the Ambulance company the plai::I 
i 
claim that the release executed with the Hygeia Ice Company ran I 
only to that company. In answer to this allegation the Supreme] 
Court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judg·] 
ment for the defendant by holding that: 
"Inasmuch as it appears that the plaintiffs had 
accepted the settlement and released their claim 
for their loss from the death of their son, the 
trial court was justified in his determination 
that there remained to them no further cause of 
action on which to maintain this suit against the 
defendant ambulance company." 
The three Utah cases cited above apply to the factual 
: 
situation at hand only by analogy. In each of the cases mention<JI 
the court, as a matter of law, allows the release contract to ' 
extend to parties that are not involved in the written instrument 
h ti The court and bars recovery by the release against sue par es. 
released the employer because of the release affecting the e~~ 
ni' 
the doctor discharged because of the release to the employer, a , 
d from l ;abil.; ty because of ti the ambulance company was exonerate L L 
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release of the swimming pool owner. 
In the case at hand the connection between the re-
leased party, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
and the defendant is much closer--the defendant is a party to 
the contract. As long as the release remains valid as to State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the defendant is also 
released as to liability because the release cannot be set aside 
until all parties thereto are brought into the action. Three 
distinct factors illustrate the close connectedness between the 
party released and the defendant: 
A. The Release Contract - The plaintiff, defendant, 
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
are all parties to the release contract and the 
release as to one constitutes a release as to all. 
Exhibit 28 
B. Insurance Contract - The first paragraph of Section 
I of the insurance contract between the defendant 
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
expressly gives State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company the right to negotiate and settle the 
plaintiff's claim and as a result of the execution 
of the release State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company became a direct party to the release, there-
fore, long as the release remains valid as to the as 
insurance company it remains valid and effective as 
to the defendant. Exhibit 81 
- 23 -
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C. Plaintiff's Negotiations - Plaintiff's affirm-
ative steps to negotiate with the absent insur-
ance company and to settle with them as a party ' 
to the contract clearly show that the release is 
valid as to the insurance company. Tr 158-159 
Exhibits 34 and 35 
Defendant claims that since the release of the employe: 
supported release of the employer, release of the company allOlleil 
release of the doctor and release of the swimming pool owner wai i 
a sufficient release of the ambulance company then a fortiori 
release of the insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company,must constitute release of the insured defendant. 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I Sec. 7, provides 
as follows: 
·~o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
The comparable section of the Constitution of the 
United States of America is Amendment XIV Sec. 1 provides as 
follows: 
''Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." 
The contract right with plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, . 
I 
as to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company would be I I 
a property right. I 
h f P Bonneville ]rl: I The Utah Court in t e case o .=....::a~r~r~y~v~·_!::..::.:.:=:-'-"'~~~ 
Dist. et al, 263 P. 751 (1928) states: 
- 24 -
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"It is of course an elementary rule of law that there 
~an be no judicial action affecting vested rights that 
:s not based up~n some process or notice whereby the 
interes~ed_p~rties_are brought within the jurisdiction 
of the Judicial tribunal about to render judgment." 
It would be difficult to see how the right could be 
extinguished as to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
without the court having jurisdiction of the company. 
Other Utah cases have dealt with this subject. The 
case of Naisbitt v. Herrick et al, 290 P. 950 (1930) states: 
"'Due process' requires that judgment affecting property 
be based on service of process calculated to give notice." 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah et al, 279 P. 612 (1929) states it: 
"Notice and an opportunity to be heard are elementary 
requirements of due process of law, when the rights 
of a party are to be affected by judicial proceeding." 
The cancellation of the contract as to State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company without obtaining jurisdiction of 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company would be void as 
being unconstitutional. 
The Texas court, in a 1955 case, held that the insurance 
company had a vested right in the contract of release of the 
insured even though the release was an absolute release and the 
insurance company was not named in the instrument as a contract-
ing party. Pattison v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 278 S.W. 
2d 207. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFF AND LaVELL BROWN, AGENT FOR THE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
AS TO THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF SUFFERED AN INJURY TO HIS NECK 
AND SPINE. 
AS TO THE PLEADINGS: 
Rule 8 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) 
a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative 
or of several different types may be demanded." 
Rule 9 (b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be sue~ 
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally." 
Our Utah court in the case of Heathman v. Hatch, 13 
Utah 2d 266; 372 P.2d 990 (1962) states: 
"The basic facts must be set forth with sufficient 
particularity to show what facts are claimed to 
constitute such charges." 
The court also states: 
"The objective of these rules is to require that 
the essential facts upon which redress is sought 
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be set fo:th with simplicity, brevity, clarity 
and certainty so that it can be determined whether 
there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed· 
and, if.so, so tha7 there will be a clearly defin~d 
foundation upon which further proceedings by way of 
responsive pleadings and/or trial can go forward in 
an orderly manner." 
The pleading by Mr. Campbell as to mistake was: 
"Said Agreement was VOID or VOIDABLE by reason that 
there was a mutual mistake of fact between the plaintiff 
and Lavell Brown, agent for State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company, as to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff on 
the 9th day of September, 1973. That the plaintiff in 
fact suffered certain injuries to his neck and spine 
and other areas of his body which were unknown to him 
or LaVell Brown at the time said "Agreement and Release" 
was signed." 
Plaintiff claimed that he had a neck and spine injury 
that was unknown to Lavell Brown, agent for State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company and himself as of September 21, 1973. 
AS TO WHAT FACTS MAY BE REVIEWED: 
The court may review the facts as to that portion of 
the complaint asking a cancellation of the contract with State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company because the matter of 
cancellation deals with equity. 
"In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of 
both law and fact." Constitution of Utah, Article 8, 
Section 9. 
This same provision is restated in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 72 and by the pronouncements of the court, 
ie Ream v. Fitzen, filed June 13, 1978, Utah Supreme Court File 
No. 15220. 
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AS TO THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED TO CANCEL A CONTRACT BECAUSE 
OF MISTAKE: 
The degree of proof required to cancel a contract 
because of mistake is different than the degree of proof in 
the ordinary civil case. Listed below are three Utah cases 
which define the degree of proof required. 
Evidence to sustain mutual mistake of fact must be 
clear, definite and convincing and party asserting 
it should not be guilty of negligence in execution 
of contract. Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 374; 
423 P.2d 657. 
To prove such a mistake as will avoid the effects 
of a written contract, evidence must be clear and 
convincing. Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 
P. 2d 621. 
If there is no doubt that both parties contracted 
in light of a belief that a certain situation or 
condition was true and it is claimed by one party 
that their belief was in fact a mistaken belief, 
latter must prove by clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing evidence that situation or condition in 
reliance on which contract was made, was at time 
of making thereof different from that which both 
parties supposed or believed it to be. Kirch~estner 
v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 118 Utah 41; 233 P. d 699. 
AS TO THE PUBLIC POLICY FOR GIVING EFFECT TO CONTRACTS: 
The general consideration of the law is to give effect 1 
to the agreements contained in parties contracts. The Utah court' 
has spoken on this subject on 'many occasions. Below are listed 
cases outlining this general theory in our law. 
In absence of compelling considerations of policy 
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to contrary, it is duty of court to give effect 
to covenants to which parties have agreed in their 
contracts. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America 
17 Utah 2d 114; 405 P.2d 339. ' 
People should be entitled to contract on their own 
terms without indulgence of paternalism by courts 
in alleviation of one side or another from the effects 
of a bad bargain. Carlson v. Hamilton 8 Utah 2d 272· 
332 P.2d 989. ' ' 
Persons should be permitted to enter into contracts 
that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead 
to hardship on one side, and it is only where it 
turns out that one side or the other is to be penal-
ized by enforcement of the contract so unconscionable 
that no fair-minded person would view the ensuing 
result without a profound sense of injustice, that 
equity will deny the use of its jurisdiction in enfor-
cement of such unconscionability. Id. 
It is not the function of the court to renegotiate 
a contract of the parties. Id. 
The purpose of contract is to reduce to writing the 
conditions upon which the minds of the parties have 
met and to fix their rights and duties in respect 
thereto, and intent so expressed is to be found, if 
possible, within the four corners of instrument it-
self in accordance with ordinary accepted meaning 
of words used. E~hraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 
2d 163; 321 P.2d 21. 
Even if a contract is ill advised and burdensome, 
court cannot make a new contract for the parties. 
Tooele Citl v. Settlement Canyon Irr. Co., 4 Utah 
2d 215; 29 P.2d 881. 
AS TO APPLYING THE ABOVE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE: 
Plaintiff, Eugene P. Campbell, and LaVell Brown, agent 
for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, negotiated 
at length to reach an acceptable agreement because plaintiff was 
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still under the doctor's care with his neck and back. The 
agreement called for substantial medical and wage loss benefits, 
Each party to the contract kept a copy and Mr. Campbell had his 
copy in his possession until December of 1973, when he took it 
to his attorney, Jackson Howard. See more complete statements 
in this Brief, pages 4, 5, and 6. 
Mr. Campbell, immediately after the accident in questk 
went to the Carbon Hospital, where he gave a history of being 
injured in an automobile accident, suffering pain in his neck 
and having headaches. Dr. Gorishek examined Mr. Campbell and 
found spasm in the tissues of the neck, limitation of motion in 
the neck in all directions, and radiographic evidence of acute 
injury and chronic degeneration. Dr. Gorishek reached the 
diagnosis of cervical sprain. Dr. Gorishek prescribed a muscle 
relaxant and pain medication and advised Mr. Campbell to apply 
heat to his neck. Dr. Gorishek next saw Mr. Campbell on the 
19th of September, 1973, and found his condition substantially 
the same. Dr. Gorishek knew that Mr. Campbell had an injury to 
his neck, but the consequences of the injury turned out worse 
than he originally thought. See more complete statements in 
this Brief, pages 8, 9, 10, and 11. 
The evidence is to the effect that it was a soft 
tissue injury and as stated by Dr. Gorishek, Tr-50, "the path· 
ogenic condition of Mr. Campbell's neck was undoubtedly the 
b 7 1973" Pathogenic same September 9, 1973, as it was Decem er , · 
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being defined by Dr. Gorishek as, "the cause of the illness 
or symptom". Tr-51. 
The evidence is overwhelming that Eugene P. Campbell 
and LaVell Brown, at the time the document was executed were 
well aware of the injury to Mr. Campbell's neck and spine. 
After the meeting with Mr. Campbell, LaVell Brown wrote: 
"Claimant is still under doctor's care with neck and 
back so I negotiated an open release." Exhibit 29 
Mr. Campbell, of course, stated in his original 
history on the day of the accident that he was suffering from 
pain in his neck. Exhibit 39. Tr-16. Eugene P. Campbell 
admitted on September 19, 1973, two days before the release was 
executed, that he was having considerable pain and discomfort 
in his neck. Tr-143. In fact, he took off a half day's work 
on the 19th of September, 1973, to see Dr. Gorishek because he 
was having difficulty. Tr-144. 
The contract itself contemplated further medical 
expenses and loss of wages. 
Eugene P. Campbell received an immediate cash settle-
ment which was satisfactory when made and he further received a 
very substantial written protection against the eventuality that 
occurred. Furthermore, Mr. Campbell availed himself of the con-
tractual benefits. 
As said about Carrie M. Carter, in the case of Carter 
v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005, there can be no question that after 
the accident Mr. Campbell knew and was informed that he had an 
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injury to his neck. This is without a doubt a case in which 
a release was given for a known neck injury, the future of 
which was speculative. 
The syllabus of Carter vs. Kingsford, heretofore 
referred to, reads as follows: 
"Where, at time of accident, diagnosis was "cervical 1 
strain, strain of left shoulder and superficial abra-
sions," and it was indicated that X-rays and analysis, 
indicated slight degenerative disc disease at C-5 a~ 
6 but at that time there was no reason for progn~~ 
of any necessary or possible surgical repair, and tlm: 
plaintiff knew she had injury to her neck, her subse· I 
quent troubles were "unknown consequences of a known 1 
injury" which did not authorize avoidance of release."I 
Defendant's contention is that Mr. Campbell's injury 
fell clearly within the principle announced in the Carter vs. 
Kingsford case. The overwhelming evidence as to Mr. Campbell's 
and Mr. Brown's knowledge of the neck injury is only strengthene:1 
by the form of the contract entered into between State Farm Muttl 
Automobile Insurance Company and Eugene P. Campbell, which cont!i 
plated further expense in connection with the injury. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF, EUGENE P. CAMPBELL, BY HIS CONDUCT AFTrn 
SEPTEMBER 21, 1973, RATIFIED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND 
STATE FARM MU11JAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
AS TO SIGNING CONTRACT: 
0 S t b 21 1973 Lavell Brown, agent for State n ep em er , , 
d P Campbell Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company an Eugene · 
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met in Helper, Utah for the purpose of settling Mr. Campbell's 
claim against Pearl Stagg. 
Lavell Brown proposed the settlement of the entire 
matter for a sum of either $1600 or $1800 on a release basis. 
Tr-155, lines 12-25. 
Mr. Campbell refused to settle on a complete release 
because Mr. Campbell knew that he had an injury, but he did not 
know the extent of his injury and he wanted to protect himself 
'I for future medical expenses and loss of wages. Tr-127-128. The 
'I provision for medical expenses and loss of wages were important 
to him at the time he signed the contract. Tr-158-159. 
u: 
Mr. Campbell was given a copy of the contract after it 
was signed on September 21, 1973. 
AS TO MR. CAMPBELL'S INJURY: 
Up until December, 1973, Mr. Campbell's condition re-
mained fairly static as he continued treatment under Dr. Gorishek. 
For a more complete detail of the fact situation as to the medical 
condition of Mr. Campbell, see his medical condition outlined in 
this Brief, pages 8-14. 
From December 19, 1973, to January 4, 1974, plaintiff 
was in the St. Mark's Hospital being treated daily by several 
doctors, Exhibit 40, the same being the hospital records for the 
December, 1973, hospitalization. 
AS TO ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT: 
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The draft given to Mr. Campbell by Mr. Brown on 
September 21, 1973, was sent for collection by Walker Bank 
and Trust Company, Price, Utah, and not paid by The Greeley 
National Bank, Greeley, Colorado, until October 1, 1973. 
Exhibit 56. 
Mr. Campbell continued to go to doctors in COIUlection 
with his neck injury and ran up medical bills which he would 
submit to the insurance company for payment under the provisions 
of the contract. Exhibits 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
67, and 68. 
Plaintiff continued to negotiate the drafts issued by 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company after the lawsuit 
had been filed but before Pearl Stagg had been served. 
AS TO APPLICABLE LAW: 
If an injured person executes a contract of release, 
which was sufficiently clear as to be understandable by a person 
of ordinary intelligence, continues to have a copy of it in his 
possession at all times, confers with bis lawyer in regard to the 
contract and continues to receive benefits, he then as a matter 0' 
law ratifies the contract. See Wells v. Evans Products CompaEY, 
446 P.2d 108. 
The companion case of Wells v. Mix, 512 P.2d 788 (~ffil 
reaffirms the rule as follows: 
"Ratification of a release occurs when the releasor, . 
with full knowledge of the facts entitling him to resci:, 
d . . . to a reasoni:: engages in unequivocal con uct giving rise 
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inference that he intended the conduct to amount 
to ratification." 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ERROR, HAS APPLIED UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, SECTION 78-27-44, ALLOWING INTEREST 
ON SPECIAL DAMAGES RETROACTIVELY CONTRARY TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, SECTION 68-3-3, WHICH PROVIDES: "NO PART OF THESE REVISED 
STATUTES IS RETROACTIVE UNLESS EXPRESSLY SO DECLARED." 
, 
The trial court made a finding that interest on special 
damages was due from the date of the injury, September 9, 1973, 
until March 10, 1978, the same being $6,611.75, in accordance 
with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-27-44. R-526. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44 
provides as follows: 
"In all actions brought to recover damages for personal 
injuries sustained by any person, resulting from or 1 
occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporatiort, 
association or partnership, whether by negligence or 
willful intent of that other person, corporation, assoc-
iation, or partnership, and whether that injury shall 
have resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be lawful 
for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on 
the special damages alleged from the date of the occur-
rence of the act giving rise to the cause of action and 
it shall be the duty of the court, in entering judgment 
for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of 
damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found
0 by the court, interest on that amount calculated at 8% 
per annum from the date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause ~f actio~ t~ the da~e of ent~r­
ing the judgment, and to include it in that Judgment. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44, 
became effective May 13, 1975. See Laws of 1975, Chapter 97. 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 68-3-3, provides: 
'~o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." 
Three Utah cases have construed Utah law as requiring 
prospective application of the statute rather than t re rospective 
application. 
A 1944 case, In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337; 
148 P.2d 340; held: 
"Legislative enactments operate prospectively rather 
than retrospectively, unless expressly declared other· 
wise." 
A 1947 case, McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers 1 Retireme1 
Board, 177 P.2d 725, discussed the problem as follows: 
"Ordinarily legislative enactments are intended to 
operate prospectively and not retrospectively. As 
said in 50 Am. Jur. 494, Statutes, Section 478: 
'The question whether a statute operates retrospec-
tively, or prospectively only, is one of legislative 
intent. In determining such intent, the courts have 
evolved a strict rule of construction against a retro· 
spective operation, and indulge in the presumption 
that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments 
thereof, enacted by it to operate prospectively only, 
and not retroactively. Indeed, the general rule is 
that they are to be so construed, where they are sus· 
ceptible of such interpretation and the intention of 
the legislature can be satisfied thereby, where such 
interpretation does not produce results which the 
legislature may be presumed not to have intended, and 
where the intention of the legislature to make the 
statute retroactive is not stated in express terms.,or 
clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally? un~1s: 
takably, and unambiguously shown by necessary imptica 
tion or terms which permit no other meaning to be aM~ 
ed to them preclude all question in regard thereto!' 
leave no r~asonable doubt thereof. ~rdinarily? an :r; 
tention to give a statute a retroactive operationwit 
not be inferred. If it is doubtful whether the.statui 
or amendment was intended to operate retrospect~ve~, 
the doubt would be resolved against such operation. 
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A 1958 case, Union Pacific Railroad Company v. 
Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101; 329 P.2d 398; lays down the 
rule as follows: 
"As ~o any.statutory question, Utah's policy demands 
the inclusion of any express authorization to justify 
any retrospective application of a statute." 
As a note to this rule, the court explains: 
"Since 1898, in a number of compilations and revisions, 
lastly in Title 68-3-3, U.C.A., 1953, it has been en-
acted that "No part of these revised statutes is retro-
active, unless expressly so declared." 
The occurrence in the case at bar was September, 1973, 
and the application of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
Section 78-27-44, allowing interest on special damages retro-
actively would be contrary to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
68-3-3, which provides: 
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." 
CONCLUSION 
The contract between Eugene P. Campbell and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, containing the release of 
Pearl Stagg, was plead as a bar to plaintiff's tort action, the 
execution of the contract being admitted and plead by plaintiff. 
The contract is a bar to plaintiff's action until it is rescinded. 
To rescind a contract all parties interested in the 
contract must be joined. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, as the insurer of defendant, has an interest in and is 
the contracting party of the contract that would have to be set 
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aside and therefore, is an indispensable party. 
The evidence demonstrates that there was no mutual 
mistake of fact between plaintiff and LaVell Brown, agent for 
the insurance company, as to the fact that plaintiff suffered 
an injury to his neck and spine and therefore, as a matter of 
law, defendant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court with a direction that the lower court enter a 
judgment "no cause for action" against plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, with full knowledge of his neck injury, 
continued to receive the benefits of the contract by accepting 
payment from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
until after the present action was filed and therefore, he ~s 
ratified the contract between himself and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company. 
The trial court, in error, has applied Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 78-27-44, allowing interest 
on special damages retroactively contrary to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Section 68-3-3, which provides: "No part of these revised 
statutes is retroactive unless expressly so declared." 
Respectfully submitted this (}(pZ( day of July, 1978. 
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